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The Virtuous Power in Stoicism or How to Prevent International Conflicts.

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La Filosofia
il Castello
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VALORI / VALUES



Continuità
e Cambiamento /
Continuity
and Change

23 Settembre
1 Ottobre
2017





Continuità e cambiamento /
Continuity and change

**23 settembre – 1 ottobre
2017**

Conference presented for the general public at Isquia International Festival of Philosophy in the section 3) *The value of values: their utility and applications*, and for the research area *Political philosophy*. September 29, 2017.

The Virtuous Power in Stoicism or How to Prevent International Conflicts.

I want to thank the academics for accepting this work, this is a first approximation and reflection of how we could use the stoic ethics for assuaging contemporary political conflicts. I hope this paper could be longer developed in a later study. I want to thank all the staff for their kind welcoming and organization.

Francisco Miguel Ortiz Delgado

The founder of stoicism, Zeno of Citium, established that the most important and the only real value is the virtue, that is, the *summum bonum*.¹ It is possible to distinguish four cardinal virtues in stoicism: temperance, justice, prudence, and courage.² But all four of them can be reduced to one. There are also other values not identical to virtue, the stoicism called such values “preferable indifferents”³ or, as Anthony Long named them, things with “conventional value”.⁴ Here I will use this term, “conventional value”, to describe the assets like life, health, power, richness, or friendship. And I will refer to the *summum bonum*, the virtue or group of virtues, as the “supreme value”.

The ancient stoicism gave primacy to the supreme value over all the rest of things. This philosophy said that only the virtue can lead to happiness; therefore, people only have to achieve the virtuous life or to act always according to the God-Nature in order to be happy.

The virtuous people will be happy despite possessing "too much" or nothing of "conventional values". The virtuous will not disturb his *apátheia* or *ataraxia* to possess or to acquire any

¹ Lactantius, *Divinarum Institutionum.*, III 8 [S.V.F. I 179]

² Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantibus*, 1034C.

³ Diogenes Laertius, VII. 89.

⁴ A term used by Long in Long, Anthony A., *Stoic studies*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 198-200.

conventional value. Cicero reminds us that "Zeno [...] defines a perturbation, *πάθος* as he calls it, to be a commotion of mind contrary to reason. Some more briefly say that a perturbation is a too vehement desire, and by its being too vehement they mean its departing too far from the even temperament of nature".⁵ Therefore, the vicious or ignorant is stamped by a preference for the conventional values over acting virtuously; such preference will lead him to have bad or incorrect sentiments (*patheiai*). For example, the ignorant could develop an incorrect fear of losing his life instead of a correct fear toward death. Or he could develop an incorrect love for their friends instead of a correct one. The incorrect sentiments or passions (*patheiai*) will lead to act viciously and will make everyone unhappy.

Then, following the stoic theory of values, it is possible to exercise power virtuously. Understanding "power" as the political, military, and economical, force and capability of a person or a group of persons (such like the State), we can establish that stoicism accepted that there is a way to wield such force-capability correctly. This correct exertion of power is what I call "virtuous power", that is, the power used sagely. Theoretically, if all people of the world and specially the leaders exerted the power wisely, then there would be no wars and no conflicts.

Epictetus, of the late stoicism, explained that the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, the Macedonian Conquests, the Roman-Danubian Wars, and other conflicts,⁶ were provoked by the ignorance of the correct place where to put our personal "convenience". For Epictetus, we must set our conveniences, in order to achieve happiness, in the only place we actually control, that is, in our capacity of deciding. All the conventional values are not really under our control,⁷ they are not ours: the life, the health, the material goods, the fame, they are things that anyone could anytime lose. So, if we put our "convenience" in such conventional values, we will make a mistake because we will be seeking for something contingent, uncontrollable.

In reference of Epictetus's ethical advises for good-living, Susanne Bobzien says: his "[...]motivation is chiefly prudential and pragmatic: if one is aware of the limits of one's power, one's future plans will be more realistic [...] and consequently one's future

⁵ Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* IV 11, Andrew P. Peabody, translator, Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1886, pp. 202-203.

⁶ *Disertaciones* libro II, XXII 19-23.

⁷ "No doubt it is truth, just as the Stoics thought, that many of our emotions are directed at things outside our own control, if not money and fame then health...". Graver, Margaret, *Stoicism and emotions*, Chicago, The Chicago University Press, 2007, p. 211.

disappointments will be minimized.”⁸ Epictetean philosophy (as other stoic philosophies) is primarily pragmatic, not speculative. It had a globally social and political goal: to make more sage people and, with this, to reduce to minimum the daily interpersonal conflicts as well to reduce the collective fights, the international and internal wars.

II.

I consider that the stoic moral philosophy could help to assuage, to some modest extent, the international conflicts. If the people and the different leaders followed some Stoic attitudes and ways of thinking, then we could have a better chance to surpass some conflicts and fights.

I recognize as fundamentally useful to assuage global conflicts the following four stoic ideas or inferences:

- 1) History "demonstrates" that all the conflicts were originated from ethical errors, that is, originated from bad sentiments toward some conventional values.
- 2) We must act correctly⁹ toward all human beings because all we are equally part of Nature.
- 3) Only to act correctly will assure us happiness because our decisions are the only aspect of life we can control.
- 4) The conventional values, not handled correctly, will lead us to develop incorrect sentiments.

If we have in our minds that all the major disgraces provoked by war were originated because some individuals put their convenience in (reaching) power, richness or honor, instead of putting it in the supreme value, then, potentially, we will be more cautious in what we feel towards conventional values. For example according to Stoics, the Persian Wars have been originated by the incorrect ambition of Darius, or the Peloponnesian War have been originated by the incorrect love of Spartans and Athenians to their respective honor. Analogously, we could interpret that, let's say, the First World War was originated by the incorrect desire of lands and prestige that Wilhelm II and the Germans had, as well by the

⁸ Bobzien, Susanne, *Determinism and freedom in stoic philosophy*, Nueva York, Clarendon Press, 1998.

⁹ We must take in mind that "Motivation, it seems, is [...] discussed in terms of what seems appropriate, not in terms of what seems good." Vogt, K. M., *Law, Reason and the Cosmic City*, Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 180.

incorrect love of British, French, or Russians, for their respective honor or for lands and properties.

If politicians have in mind the first idea aforementioned, that historical conflicts are provoked by erroneous approximations to life, it is possible to reduce the possibility of provoking global wars. When leaders don't place their primary interest in things like acquiring more power or fame, then it could be possible to reduce the possibilities of war.

According to the stoic Ethics we could also say, for instance, that the 1846 Mexican-American war was originated by the incorrect sentiment of Americans towards lands and an incorrect passion of Mexicans for defending their territory. We are not saying that there is no necessity of lands for societies, but in stoicism, there is a difference between a correct-desire for lands and an incorrect-desire for lands. The first kind of sentiment is always accord to the norms of nature and can be fulfilled with the supreme value and leads to happiness.

Historically, in the thirties and forties of nineteenth century, the white settlers were allowed to set themselves inside Mexican territory but the incorrect-desire for lands of some settlers and many American politicians led them to plot an incorrect war against Mexico. The same applies to all epochs; there are a correct-desire and an incorrect-desire from Americans and Mexicans all-together, to protect their own territory. We can learn from the latter reflection that there is an incorrect-desire for protecting our own country, a form of incorrect nationalism, which has historically ended in war (not always beneficial for those who have started the war).

Our second tentatively useful stoic idea, that "we must act correctly with all human beings, because all we are part of the same Nature", is useful because it helps us to back and support important ideas like the one sustained by the first article of the universal declaration of Human Rights: "All humans beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience [...]".¹⁰ We know this sounding declaration has its basis in Stoic philosophy. Why are all human beings born free? According to stoicism, because Nature provided all of us with the faculty of being free, that is, with the faculty of choosing to act correctly, always without any internal hindrance. All we are born without any internal, divine and/or metaphysical hindrance, that could limit our capacity to select what is correct.

¹⁰ Internet: www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/

Europeans, Americans, Africans, Asians, all members of all societies of the world, must treat correctly everyone, not only their countrymen, in order to avoid any hindrance to achieve virtue-happiness. As Tad Brennan put it: "Instead of treating only one's biological kin as near and dear, one will treat all the other citizens [of the Cosmic city] as one's brother, sisters, parents, and children".¹¹ For the Stoics, the whole World is a single Cosmic city,¹² we all live in it. Therefore, we all must improve it and treat well all of its inhabitants. If we carelessly treat all foreigners and immigrants, then it is clear that we will develop an incorrect sentiment against foreigners and an incorrect sentiment of love toward our countrymen. Such passions will enslave us because they will create a hindrance to achieve virtue-happiness.

Politicians must practice *virtuous power* to build a more just world. Persons like Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Erdogan, Maduro, Peña Nieto, etcetera, for a better world, should learn to virtuously concentrate efforts not only in regional issues but in world issues. For example, regional immigration will not be solved changing some laws in a particular country or closing some ports or building a "big, beautiful wall" as Trump has said. Immigration is not a problem just of the country receiving immigrants; it is a world problem that would be reduced or solved when the whole world cooperates wisely for its solution (for the benefit of both the land receiving migrants and the countries producing migration, that is, everyone).

In our third idea, "Only to act correctly will assure happiness", we can say that is useful as we convince some leaders, at least in some degree, of the truth of such affirmation. If some powerful person was convinced that neither the power, nor the wealth, nor the health, nor the loved ones, will assure happiness, ergo, that person won't have been vicious-unhappy and won't have had suffer. This argument is why Stobaeus said that the virtuous is happy, fortunate, blissful, friend of the gods, venerable, apt to command, good administrator.¹³

The general welfare could increase when people with power are convinced that the conventional values won't provide happiness to anybody. And this reasoning and attitude is not unseen nowadays, we can find it in leaders of the Modern world. I consider the way of life and the ideas of Uruguay's ex-president José Mujica as prominently stoic, in the ancient philosophical sense. He used his power virtuously most of the time; he was aware that power, wealth, fame or health, are unimportant to achieve personal happiness, or at least he acted

¹¹ Brennan, Tad, *The Stoic life. Emotions, duties and fate*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 160.

¹² A strong argument for cosmopolitanism. Plutarch, *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute* 329a-b (S.V.F. 1.262; LS 67A).

¹³ Stobaeus, *Églogas* II 7, 11 g. p. 99 W, *Los estoicos antiguos*, p. 133.

consequently to that idea. When he renounced to the 90% of his 12,000 dollars salary he demonstrated that the money did not springed an incorrect sentiment in him, nor did the power, as he never wanted any more periods for wielding political power. The 90% of his salary was destined to welfare, charity institutions and others. It is desirable that more leaders and private people should behave like Mújica, at least in some degree, for making a better world. And this applies specially, for leaders with authoritarian behavior, like Kim Jong Un, and others, because if they accepted that honor, pride, power, wealth and fame, don't make them or anyone happy, they would not live continuously anguished for acquiring-preserving their honor, pride, power, etc. And they will have a more realistic expectations in life, as Bobzien said.

Donald Kagan's study of the origins of the wars reveals that one of the most important factors or the most important, for a war to unleash is the honor's high esteem inside different societies. The historian Kagan established that, specifically, the Pelopponesian War, the Second Punic War, the Great War, the Second World War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, were all originated because one or both of the sides confronting each other, considered that the other one insulted them. Kagan concludes that the wars's origin lies in one or two antagonist groups acting in response for a supposedly tainted honor.¹⁴ This explication is very similar to the Epictetus's interpretation of war's origins; Athenians, Spartans, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Carthaginians, Dacians, for Epictetus, all commenced wars because they incorrectly placed their convenience in their honor and other conventional values.

Cicero describes that the incorrect sentiments or passions infect and sick people, but we must confront them:

[...] when money is desired [concupita pecunia], and reason [ratio] is not immediately applied, as a sort of Socratic remedy [medicina] which would cure that desire [cupiditatem], the evil flows into the veins and inheres in the bowels, and becomes and a sickness which, when chronic, cannot be extirpated, and the name of that disease is "avarice". The case is the same with other diseases, as the desire of fame, or the passion for women [...] and other diseases and sicknesses have a like origin [morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur].¹⁵

¹⁴ Kagan, Donald, *Sobre las causas de la guerra y la preservación de la paz (On the Origin of War and the Preservation of Peace)*, Josefina de Diego, traductora, México, Turner/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003.

¹⁵ Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations IV 24-25*, Op. Cit., pp. 210-211.

These ciceronian reflections reinforce our point 4) "The not handled correctly conventional values will lead us to develop incorrect sentiments". Conventional values not handled correctly have resulted in causing disgraces, according to a stoic interpretation of the history; and following Cicero's words, the conventional values not handled wisely have led their possessors to a disease called passion.

But we must remember that the stoical advise for being alert toward conventional values and toward the passions these arise on us goes to all people not only the ones steering the government.

Stoicism could be helpful to allay conflicts in the three different levels we humans could interact: in a personal and familiar realm, in Nussbaum's "Middle Realm" or "the realm of the multitude of daily transactions we have with people and social groups who are not our close friends and are also not our political institutions",¹⁶ and in an international or far-reaching level.

The stoic founder, Zeno, said the sage always must embrace political power as he would lead correctly,¹⁷ because he is unable of being a slave of any conventional power; he is the only capable to exert the virtuous power. Therefore, leaders and politicians must specially have to emulate the way of the stoic sage. But when people situate conventional values like honor and prestige in the top position of a scale of values, these people could develop an incorrect desire for such values, an incorrect coveting for protecting them, or an incorrect fear of losing them.

When public and powerful individuals like Donald Trump insult a whole nation saying, for instance, about all Mexican immigrants "They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people",¹⁸ it can outburst a vicious hate and

¹⁶ Nussbaum, Martha, *Anger and Forgiveness. Resentment, Generosity, Justice*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 7.

¹⁷ Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, *De tranquillitati animi*, I 10 (S.V.F. I 28).

¹⁸ Speech on June 16, 2015.

anger in several people.¹⁹ Of course, many times is inevitable to feel anger, resentment, for the words of someone, that is very human, but, we repeat, there is an appropriate and an inappropriate way to feel anger.

The correct way to be angry is the one where anger does not dominate us, where we can show our repulsion or, even, when we do acts against the offender but never doing something contrary to justice, temperance, prudence and bravery. The wise man or woman is free of passions because he or she is not predisposed to these "diseases".²⁰ The incorrect way to be angry is the one where anger dominates us, where we do acts that are unjust, intemperate, imprudent and/or coward against the one who attacked us (acts like torturing the attacker). We people should never let this kind of anger take over us.

We should defend our honor but never be falling in the perpetration of unvirtuous acts. We should defend our nation's honor but to a limit, not start unjust wars because of incorrect passions toward conventional values like honor. This calm attitude or state of the soul is proper of the *ataraxia*; this state was what the Stoics (and other hellenistic philosophies) always sought. The attitude of the Mexican leaders and others should be of calm and temperance toward the insults, boasts and threats, of an American president. That approach, of course, will not ameliorate the diplomatic relations between the two governments (or the two countries); nevertheless, it will prevent the problem to get worst.

Of course, the calm and prudent attitude of a government toward the offenses of other governments could be cataloged as a weak and coward attitude. But, for most of Stoics, those people estimating weak a president who has not a strong response toward some verbal attacks, are not-wise people; they are persons that place the country's honor in a top position in the scale of values, over the supreme value. Therefore, Stoicism has the objective of convincing people to develop correct sentiments toward the conventional values; as *eupatheiai* or good sentiments are, as described by Graver, "corrected versions of human feelings, not diminished versions. We should think of them as being like the easy movements of a powerful athlete,

¹⁹ Hate and anger could belong to the pain, one of the four generic stoic vices (desire, fear, pain and pleasure). Stobaeus, *Églogas* II 7, 10, [S.V.F. I 211], in *Los estoicos antiguos*, p. 131.

²⁰ D.L., VII, 117-126. P. 186.

forceful but without strain."²¹ For stoicism (as in Platonism) the temperance and the prudence values are superior to honor and integrity; then, stoicism also try to teach that anybody with temperance and prudence are better than the ones with a greater sense of honor.

A bragger and bully president should not be humiliated, but we should treat him with the honor and temperance he does not treat us, in this way we also demonstrate we are better than him. Only in the case that such bully president represents a real, not an empty threat to our country the leaders and the people should take stronger actions, but they must never take a not-virtuous action.

Stoicism could be helpful, I consider, not only to ideally prevent international conflicts but to improve internal conflicts of one society. For Mexico, a country nowadays living in a profoundly corrupted system and with extreme violence in several regions, would be beneficial if its community would practice the Stoic ideals. In a country where the Christian-catholic ethics are so ineffective and useless against corruption and crime, it could be resourceful to give an opportunity to another way of thinking ethics. Mexico is full of corrupted leaders and drug smugglers. In a Stoic interpretation, this is because Mexico is full of persons that put richness and power as the superior value. Mexican society is broken because there are no ideals taught to people; their citizens are living in ignorance about what truthfully leads everyone to happiness.

Maybe, if in a country like Mexico, more people were oriented in the thought of wealth and fame not making happy anybody, then fewer people would dedicate their efforts to steal and to make money "the easy way". All people could learn that only "acting correctly" would lead to happiness because conventional values are never ours. (The money that someone receives for a bribe could be easily lost next day in an arson; the money that a narco receives for selling some drugs could be lost next week stolen by another narco). Corrupted politicians and drug smugglers have an incorrect desire for money because they think money takes them to happiness. They identify pleasure with happiness. These are reasons that explain, in a certain degree, why some people prefer to steal or give drugs to kids over doing the right; they prefer to act viciously over acting justly.

We know philosophy is for stoics a type of therapy, particularly useful to those who have an incorrect-extreme love for money or for their families (commodity, wealth, honor, even health,

²¹ Graver, Margaret, *Stoicism and Emotion*, op. Cit., p. 52.

for their families are still just conventional values), that is for those who suffer for extreme and incorrect sentiments.

Whoever has power, in modest or great amount, must use it virtuously-wisely if he or she wants to be happy, or, he must practice virtuous power. Laertius says that Stoics declare that:

[...] the wise man is said to be free from vanity [pride]; for he is indifferent to good or evil report. However, he is not alone in this, there being another who is also free from vanity, he who is ranged among the rash, and that is the bad man. Again, they tell us that all good men are austere or harsh, because they neither have dealings with pleasure themselves nor tolerate those who have.²²

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The therapeutic value of stoic philosophy is aimed for those that have one or several incorrect passions: like extreme fear, desire, love, etc. They must take away those slavish passions by learning and accepting what the philosophy says about the correct behavior. People must also learn that acting for the benefit of everyone, even for farther human beings, is acting for the benefit for themselves and their families. Chryssipus said that even if people would not accept the stoic assertions, they should accept, in whatever conception, that there are strong reasons to get rid of the passions.²⁴ For the passions are the diseases that provoke the corruption, the crime, the inequalities, the wars, and several other disgraces.

Revisiting the moral theory of stoicism shed light on Political Power issues of the present day. The (politically) powerful countries must use its capabilities to protect the whole world population and not only to protect their own citizens. Stoicism could help all citizens from all countries in being more tolerable with immigrants or in reducing racism; stoicism could help in understanding that improving the whole world human conditions is one the best things we can do for ourselves and our countries.

Epilogue. Conclusions.

²² D.L., VII, 117. R. D. Hicks, translator, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972.

²³ Nussbaum, Martha, *La terapia del deseo*, Barcelona, Paidós, 2002, p. 397.

To act virtuously implies to act with temperance, justice, prudence, and courage always, that is, to permanently act with the four virtues toward everyone; toward Greeks or barbarians, patricians or plebeians, countrymen or foreigners. Of course, stoicism recognized that humans prefer to help the people close to them, and stoicism established that we must accomplish first our duties of members of a family or members of a country. This is why Hierocles said that people must increase their circle of individuals considered close, until we treated all humans as they were our brothers of blood, our sons, or, at last, ourselves.

When Persians and Greeks, in the fourth century before Christ, placed their convenience in some conventional values and they didn't act virtuously toward these values; they developed some incorrect passions for them, then the Peloponnesian Wars started. Some historians have established that the origin of the Peloponnesian Wars was the Persian ambition for land; the epictetean and ethical explication of such wars would be that the Persians developed a vicious sentiment toward the conventional value called political power. The Persian leaders and their followers wielded a vicious power that led them to confront other people and cultures.

The reason for having so many wars and conflicts through all history lies, then, in the fact that the world is full of non-wise, full of people that are slave of the conventional values. It doesn't matter which were the incidental causes of war, confrontation, conflict or disgrace; the origin of these things is always the human ignorance. Zeno of Citium said that the true friendship/love exists only in the wise.²⁵ If (real) friendship/love would exist in the non-wise there would be no corruption, no crimes, no wars.

According to Epictetus, all the ancient international wars aforementioned were caused because the different leaders and their followers have put their convenience in conventional values. He said that the Trojan War, for example, was caused because Paris Alexander and Menelaus placed their conveniences in a woman, Helen or in their respective honor. If Paris and Menelaus have recognized that their love for Helen or for their own honor is not the supreme value that leads to *eudaimonia*, then they would not have gone to war.²⁶

Leaders and candidates make promises or announcements of building a racist and an illogical wall, of expelling all the immigrants, of favoring the national industries in detriment of the foreign ones, nevertheless most of the times they make such promises to gain fame and popularity not to help their people. Politicians and leaders frequently make immoral and self-

²⁵ Diógenes Laercio, (libro VII), 124, óp. cit., p. 195.

²⁶ *Diss.* II.22.23-24.

defeating actions just for the sake of their popularity and power, and this is, according to Stoicism, because they wrongfully consider fame or power as assets that guarantee happiness.

Placing family, as placing the beloved one, the material possessions, etc., as the priority in our lives is a mistake as this could lead us to develop bad passions for them; we must put the "acting always virtuously" as our priority, and this will result in the common benefit.

Stoic reflections help to introduce to the people the idea that all humans beings are born equal in dignity and rights. Because stoic ideas do argue that there is equal dignity and rights for all human beings. As everyone belongs to Nature, we must provide justice to all human beings. To provide justice is to use our reason correctly. To ensure justice to all is to protect the reason and the conscience of everyone, including our own.

(As temperance is the wisdom to act with self-control; justice is the wisdom to give everyone what is proper; prudence is the wisdom to judge between actions concerning appropriate actions at a given time; courage is the wisdom to overcome bad feelings and situations).



**La Filosofia, il Castello e la Torre – Ischia International Festival of Philosophy
2017**

dal 23 settembre al 1 ottobre

Terza edizione: Valori, continuità e cambiamento

Sabato, 23 settembre

Polifunzionale ore 21:00 “Tre sull’Altalena” opera di L. Lunari

Regia Giuseppe Iacono; Interpreti: Cenzino Di Meglio; Giuseppe Iacono; Aron Insenga

Con la partecipazione di Rosa Inserra

Ingresso: Adulti 7 Euro, Studenti 5

Per Info e Prenotazioni: info@polifunzionale.it

Domenica 24 settembre: 18:00 Torre di Guevara:

Mostra a cura di Massimo Ielasi: Scultura Classica o Semplice

Artisti: Giovanni Di Costanzo – Giovanni De Angelis

VENERDI 29 settembre e SABATO 30 settembre Ore 11 durante le relazioni:

Arte e filosofia in cammino: Incontro con il Maestro **Gabriele Renzullo**

**LUNEDI 25 settembre (15:30) Biblioteca Antoniana “Ischia Summer School of Humanities”:
“Figure del Nichilismo” (per i soli iscritti)**

Luogo: Biblioteca Antoniana, ore 17:00 Lectio Magistralis,

V.Vitiello Uni. San Raffaele Milano (aperto al Pubblico):

“Religiosità del Nichilismo. A partire da Dostoevskij”

MERCOLEDI 27 Settembre

Luogo: Giardini “La Mortella”

20:00 Concerto per piano: Maestro Simone Sala



“88 Tasti tra Romanticismo e Post Moderno”

GIOVEDÌ, 28 Settembre Luogo: Giardini la Mortella (**aperto ai soli iscritti Festival**)

APERTURA FESTIVAL

17:00 Registrazione relatori

Aperitivo

18:15: Saluti Autorità

Saluti Vicepresidente Circolo G. Sadoul Prof. Francesco Rispoli

Saluto e introduzione: Direttore Scientifico Dott. Raffaele Mirelli

19:30 Lectio Magistralis Prof. Angie Hobbs, Uni. Sheffield (Aperto al pubblico)

Nationhood and Nationalism Today: a Philosophical Perspective

2100 Cena Sociale: Ristorante **Le Stufe**

DOMENICA 1 ottobre

10:00-14:00: Escursione

Luogo: Aenaria

Pranzo: Fonte delle Ninfe Nitrodi (Facoltativo)

1400-1600: Break

1630: G. Ferraro: filosofia con i bambini

17:30: Filosofia con i ragazzi

Appuntamenti serali al Castello Aragonese

Venerdì ore 21:00 Lectio Magistralis: Markus Gabriel Uni. Bonn “I nostri Valori. Verso un Realismo Etico”

Sabato ore 21.00: Filosofia e scrittura: Una Serata con lo Scrittore. Maurizio De Giovanni e il suo Rapporto con la Filosofia

Domenica ore 21:00, Filosofia e Politica: “Napoli Città Iperuranica”. Intervista con LUIGI DE MAGISTRIS, SINDACO DELLA CITTA’ DI NAPOLI

Per le serate al Castello Aragonese prego prenotarsi scrivendo a: segreteria@castelloaragonese.it



Venerdì 29 settembre	TORRE sala superiore	TORRE sala Guevara	TORRE sala esterna
Ore 9:00	Rosario De Laurentiis La Torre Guevara		
Ore 1000	Giuseppe Ferraro, Uni. Federico II, Napoli: Essere e Divenire, la Bellezza dell'Identità e il Riguardo del Cambiamento: "come diventare quello che si è"		
Ore 1100	COFFEE BREAK	COFFEE BREAK	COFFEE BREAK
	Chair: Andrea Le Moli	Chair: Raffaele Mirelli	Chair: Alessandro De Cesaris
Ore 1130	Vito De Nardis, L. Scientifico, Lanciano: καλά έργα: Luce e Verità dell'Incontro	Sara Creola, L. Scientifico G. Galilei, Borgomanero: Il Valore della Filosofia nell'Attività Pedagogica	Sanna Toumela Uni. Oulu, Finlandia: Filosofia della Libertà in É. Boutroux
Ore 1200	Alessia Giacone, Uni. Padova: Vita Umana come Vita Degna: il Filebo e la Temperanza del Pensiero	Biscardi Federica Uni. Ca'Foscari, Venezia Young Thinker: Valore Universale e Valore Particolare. Una Mediazione.	Jensen Anthony, Providence College, Rhode Island: Value Realism and Historiographical Anti-Realism
Ore 1230	Francisco M. Ortiz Delgado Uni. Autónoma Metropolitana-Iztapalapa, Mexico The Virtuous Power in Stoicism or How to Prevent International Conflicts	Marcello Ostinelli Uni. Svizzera Italiana): L'Educazione ai Valori di Cittadinanza: tre Modelli a Confronto	Patrick Marshall, Uni. Toronto: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Agnès Varda's Vagabond
1300-1500	BREAK	BREAK	BREAK
Ore 1530	Maria Giovanna Bevilacqua, Uni. della Svizzera Italiana: Heimatlosigkeit ed Entortung Oggi: Perdita di (quali) Valori?	Riccardo Dottori, Uni. Torvergata, Roma: F. Nietzsche: la Trasvalutazione di tutti i Valori e l'Autosuperamento della Vita	Simonetta Milli Konewko Uni. Wisconsin- Milwaukee: Il Valore della Vergogna nel Romanzo Autobiografico di Maria Laurino, Were you Always an Italian?
Ore 1600	Gabriele Vissio, Uni. Paris I: Contro l'Indifferenza. Il Significato Epistemologico e Politico del Valore	Katrin Loerch-Merkle, Uni. E. Karls, Tubinga: Values as Sources of the Ought	Catherine Wheatley, King's College, UK: Living Well in the Films of Mia-Hansen Løve
Ore 1630	Maria Elena Severini, INSR, Firenze: I Valori della Ars Politica Moderna nei Ricordi di Francesco Guicciardini	Susie Schiano Di Cola, Uni. Federico II, Napoli: Ricerca di Senso e Significato	Luka Arsenjuk, Uni. Maryland: On Two Ways of Dramatizing Value: The Tragic and the Comic
Ore 1700	Riccardo Finozzi, Uni. Warwick: Liberazione versus Libertà: la Forza Molecolare come Essenza	Antonio Giuseppe Balistreri, L. Classico E. Cairoli, Varese: L'Europa e l'Umanità	Carolyn Reese Uni. Toronto: Indexical Value
Ore 1730	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break



Ore 1800	Giuseppe D'Acunto, Uni. Europea, Roma: Il Valore della Ricerca. Filosofia tra Progresso in Avanti o Permanenza. La Scala di Wittgenstein	Marco Castegnetto, Uni. Ca' Foscari, Venezia: L'Etica della Vacuità. Il Riconoscimento del Valore nel Buddhismo di Nāgārjuna	Nina Sosna, Russian Academy of Sciences: Bliss of Value
Ore 1830	Marino Piero Uni. Federico II, Napoli: Valori Immanenti in un Mondo Trascendente: una Risposta Simbolica alla Chiusura Solipsistica e "Schermata" del Soggetto nel Moderno.	Wang Zheng, Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa: Il Valore dell'Umbra nella 'Praxis' Interiore: Un Confronto fra la Nuova Forma Mentis di Giordano Bruno e Wang Yangming	Mathew Thompson Uni.Toronto: Spaceship Earth and the Gaia Hypothesis: The Rhetoric of Modern Environmentalism
1900	Break	Break	Break

Sabato 30 Settembre	TORRE sala superiore	TORRE sala Guevara	TORRE sala esterna
Ore 9:00	Luca Maria Scarantino (FISP) L'Impero e le Tribù: la Dignità Umana tra Muri, Recinzioni e Filo Spinato		
Ore 1000	Nino Daniele (Assessore Cultura e Turismo Città di Napoli): Filosofia e Cultura di Cittadinanza		
Ore 1100	COFFEE BREAK	COFFEE BREAK	COFFEE BREAK
	Chair: Le Moli	Chair: Mirelli	Chair: De Cesaris
Ore 1130	Marco Vasile Uni. Salerno: Lo Stato d'Eccezione nei Diritti dell'Uomo e la Variabilità dei Valori	Panel Young Thinkers: Autenticità ovvero il Coraggio di Essere Se Stessi. L. Ginnasio Statale Antonio Canova di Treviso. Introduce Prof. Gigliola Rossini	Ilaria Ferrara, Uni. Pavia: Bellezza e Moralità: Figura, Simbolo e Immagine alla Luce di una Prospettiva Etica.
Ore 1200	Massimo Ricchiari, Uni. Federico II, Napoli: Il Valore dell'Educazione nell'Etica di Spinoza	Gaia Santolin: Diventare Se Stessi: un Problema Antico quanto l'Uomo	Marco Versiero, École Normale Supérieure di Lione: "Una Finzione che Significa Cose Grandi": il Valore Etico e Politico delle Allegorie di Leonardo da Vinci
Ore 1230	Marina Fraldi, Uni. Studi di Milano: Lo Sfondo Simbolico dei Valori nelle Concezioni Estetico-Politiche di G. Deleuze	Cecilia Bona: Autenticità: una Condizione Esistenziale da Heidegger a Noi	Alessandro Giardino, Uni. Saint Lawrence, NY: The Neapolitan Caravaggio. Natural Religion and Social Activism
1300-1500	BREAK	BREAK	BREAK
Ore 1530	The History of Human Freedom and Dignity in	The History of Human Freedom and Dignity in Western Civilisation,	Brian Price Uni. Toronto: Value and Wonder



	<p>Western Civilisation, European Project: Considering the Value of Values, Chair: Kristian Bunkenborg, Uni. M. Luther, Halle-Wittenberg: Lessing and the Tyranny of Reason:18th Century Discourses on Freedom</p>	<p>European Project: Considering the Value of Values: Chair Michael Raubach, Uni. Aarhus: Framing the Methodological Debate, or, Considering the Value of Values</p>	
Ore 1600	<p>Jacob Renze Klamer, Uni. Aarhus: Differentiating Human dignity from Recognition, Respect and Autonomy</p>	<p>Giovanni Tortoriello, Uni. M. Luther, Halle-Wittenberg: The Debate on Human Freedom and Dignity in Renaissance and Reformation</p>	<p>Kostek Szydłowski, Uni. delle Arti, Berlino: Artefacts of Memory and Reinventing the new (Remarks on value in art)</p>
Ore 1630	<p>Karen Donskov Felzer, Uni. Munster: “You Reap What You Sow”: An Exposition of the Relevance of Innate Ideas in Anne Conway</p>	<p>Elisa Bellucci, Uni. M. Luther, Halle-Wittenberg: The idea of Christianity and Human Being in Petersen’s Thought</p>	<p>Rosario Diana, ISFP, Napoli: “Elogio della Filosofia in Forma di Decalogo”. Un’Opera-Reading e un Percorso Militante fra Filosofia e Musica</p>
Ore 1700	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break
Ore 1730	<p>Josh Roe, Uni. Munster: Is Moral Value in Human Nature Rational? The Predisposition to Personality in Kant’s Account of Morality in Human Nature</p>	<p>Elisa Zocchi, Uni. Munster: Value as Imago Dei in Von Balthasar</p>	<p>Meghan Sutherland, Uni. Toronto: Valuing Variety: On the Making of Modern Social Orders</p>
Ore 1800	<p>Panel: Chair, Sherwin Moghimi I.H.C.S.: Contemplation on the Relation between Value and Necessity in the Modern and the Ancient Political Philosophy</p>	<p>Luigi Vero Tarca, Uni. Ca’ Foscari, Venezia: LA TECNICA È UN BLUFF? IL VALORE DELLA VITA NATURALE NEL TEMPO PRESENTE</p>	<p>Elisa Rusca, Uni. Londra: Don’t Forget to Feed the Troll: Reimagining Post-Internet Values</p>
Ore 1830	<p>Shima Shasti, Uni. Islamic Azad: Contemplation on the Relation between Value and Necessity in the Modern and the Ancient Political Philosophy</p>	<p>Abraham Geil, Uni. Amsterdam: Value and/as Habit</p>	<p>Gabriele Schimmenti, Uni Salento: Bruno Bauer e il (dis-)seppellimento dell’arte. Riflessioni sulla tesi del “dissolvimento della religione nell’arte”</p>
1900	<p>Anna Di Giusto, Italian Society of Women Historians: Da Socrate a Foucault: Riflessioni per una Nuova Parresia sulle Migrazioni</p>	<p>Mathew Thompson Uni. Toronto: Spaceship Earth and the Gaia Hypothesis: The Rhetoric of Modern Environmentalism</p>	<p>Panel: Kasia Katarzyna, Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts, Polonia, Co-Author Paula Quinon, Uni. Lund, Svezia: Ethical Query into Big Data Problems. The Case of Online Dating Services</p>