This paper proposes an intersectional, non-identitarian perspective on epistemic violence, taking academic philosophy, and in particular the reinforcement of a philosophical canon, as a case of analysis. Mainstream philosophy has long been reluctant to confront its history of exclusion and the ongoing practices that marginalise some social groups, languages and regions from the legitimised circuits of philosophical knowledge building. The concept of epistemic violence, alongside a range of tools developed in recent years by social epistemology, shed light on the variety and complexity of the practices of epistemic silencing, exclusion and marginalisation that occur in all social interactions, and allow us to assess the specifically epistemic loss that they entail. In recent decades, various initiatives have sought to counteract the exclusion of certain social groups from philosophy, most notably feminist perspectives that aim to highlight some of the contributions made by women to academic philosophical reflection. However, these approaches seem insufficient when we consider the complexity of the phenomenon of epistemic violence and how various factors of social marginalisation intertwine and reinforce each other. An intersectional view shows the inadequacy of taking a single axis without considering how it is co-constituted by other variables that make it internally heterogeneous and hierarchical. It exposes how epistemic violence, but also the and non-intersectional approaches to it, reduce the questions, answers, strategies and narratives that are allowed to flourish in philosophy. Taken together, the concept of epistemic violence and an intersectional perspective reveal how mere »inclusion« is not enough to transform the philosophical canon and enrich the spectrum of perspectives in our discipline.